A door that closed in 2019

For most of the post-civil-rights-era period, federal courts were a primary venue for challenging partisan gerrymandering. The legal theories evolved over decades — from Davis v. Bandemer (1986) to Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) to Gill v. Whitford (2018) — without producing a stable judicial standard for adjudicating partisan-gerrymandering claims.

In 2019, the Supreme Court ruled in Rucho v. Common Cause that federal courts cannot adjudicate partisan-gerrymandering claims under the Constitution. The 5-4 majority held that partisan gerrymandering is a “non-justiciable political question” — a category of dispute the federal courts decline to address even when it raises constitutional concerns.

Rucho closed federal courts to partisan-gerrymandering claims as a matter of doctrine. It did not eliminate the underlying problem; it relocated the venues.

What’s filled the gap

Three primary venues have absorbed the partisan-gerrymandering work since Rucho:

State courts. State constitutions often contain provisions — fair-elections clauses, equal-protection provisions, free-elections clauses — that can be read to prohibit partisan gerrymandering even where federal courts cannot reach the issue. State supreme courts have applied these clauses with varying success.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in 2018 (League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth) that the state’s congressional map violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s free-elections clause. The North Carolina Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in 2022 (Harper v. Hall) on state-constitutional grounds, before reversing course in 2023 after the court’s composition changed. The New York Court of Appeals struck down state legislative maps on state-constitutional grounds in 2022. The Wisconsin Supreme Court issued similar rulings in 2024.

Independent redistricting commissions. Adopted in California, Michigan, Arizona, Colorado, and several other states. Commissions draw maps under transparent criteria insulated from direct legislative-majority control. State-level ballot measures have been the primary path to adoption, since legislatures rarely give up redistricting authority voluntarily.

Federal legislation. The Freedom to Vote Act would establish federal standards for redistricting (including bans on partisan and racial gerrymandering) with judicial enforcement. Rucho does not preclude federal legislation; it precludes federal-court adjudication of partisan-gerrymandering claims under the Constitution. Statutory claims under federal legislation would be justiciable.

The state-court strategy in detail

The state-court path has been the most active and the most legally innovative. Several state-level rulings have produced new districting maps that materially changed political outcomes:

Pennsylvania (2018). State Supreme Court ruling produced a new congressional map; the partisan composition of the state’s House delegation shifted measurably as a result.

Maryland (2022). State Court of Appeals struck down a Democratic-drawn congressional map; the redrawn map produced partisan composition closer to the state’s actual electoral preferences.

New York (2022). State Court of Appeals struck down state legislative maps; redrawn maps produced more competitive districts.

North Carolina (2022, then reversed 2023). Initial state Supreme Court ruling against partisan gerrymandering was reversed after court composition changed. Demonstrates the institutional vulnerability of state-court paths to political turnover on the courts themselves.

Wisconsin (2024). State Supreme Court ruling, after court composition shifted in 2023 elections, struck down state legislative maps; redrawn maps reduced extreme partisan asymmetry that had persisted for over a decade.

Florida, Ohio, others. State-level litigation continues with mixed outcomes.

The structural challenge

State-court paths have produced real wins. They face structural limits:

State court composition. State supreme court justices, in many states, are elected. State court rulings on partisan gerrymandering can be reversed when court composition changes. The North Carolina experience demonstrates this directly.

State constitutional variation. Each state’s constitution is different. Theories that succeed in one state may not be available in another. The fragmentation makes it difficult to build national doctrine.

Litigation cost and timing. Each redistricting cycle requires fresh litigation in each contested state. Maps drawn after the 2030 census will face the same litigation pipeline as maps drawn after 2020 — without efficient mechanism for resolving common questions.

Implementation friction. State courts that strike down maps often have to navigate the practical question of who draws the replacement. Some states have adopted “if the legislature fails, the court draws” frameworks; others have produced extended fights over remedy.

Independent commissions as the structural fix

The independent-commission path addresses the structural concerns more durably than state-court litigation alone. Once a state has an independent commission with a strong design (commissioner-selection process insulated from partisan control, transparent mapping criteria, supermajority approval requirements), the political fights move from the redistricting itself to the integrity of the commission process — a fight that has been less reversal-prone in the states that have adopted commissions.

Active commission-adoption campaigns for 2025-2026: Ohio (multiple ballot attempts), Wisconsin (constitutional amendment process), Pennsylvania (legislative path stalled), Florida (multiple attempts). Each fight is state-specific in design but shares the common political pattern: a partisan majority opposes commission adoption because it would reduce the majority’s mapping advantage.

The federal lever, despite Rucho

The federal lever for redistricting reform did not disappear with Rucho. It shifted:

Freedom to Vote Act. Federal statutory standards for redistricting, including a ban on partisan and racial gerrymandering with judicial enforcement under the statute. Has had Senate floor votes; not enacted.

John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act. Restores the Voting Rights Act preclearance regime that was struck down in Shelby County v. Holder (2013). Preclearance is not specifically about partisan gerrymandering but addresses the racial-gerrymandering subset that the VRA framework covered.

Statutory criteria. Federal legislation that requires states to use specific districting criteria (compactness, communities of interest preservation, etc.) without directly adjudicating partisan effects.

The combined federal-and-state strategy is the realistic path forward. Federal action on the procedural framework (commissions, criteria, statutory bans). State action on the specific maps and on independent-commission adoption. State-court litigation as the immediate-cycle backstop where maps have been gerrymandered without the time for structural reform to take effect.

What to watch

• State-court rulings in pending cases.
• Independent commission adoption campaigns in OH, WI, PA, FL, and others.
• Freedom to Vote Act and John Lewis Act reintroduction and floor consideration.
• Pre-2030-census state actions on commissions, criteria, and procedural reforms — the next decennial cycle is approaching.
• State supreme court election outcomes. Composition changes have produced redistricting-rulings reversals in several states.
• Mid-decade redistricting. Some states have engaged in mid-decade map redraws; the practice is legally contested in many states.

Bottom line

Rucho closed federal courts to partisan-gerrymandering claims, but the broader gerrymandering reform agenda has continued through state courts, independent commissions, and federal legislation. The state-court path has produced real wins but faces structural vulnerability to court-composition changes. Independent commissions are the more durable structural fix and are the primary work between now and the 2030 census. Federal legislation — should it advance — would provide the statutory framework that Rucho closed off in constitutional terms.