An idea that finally has a track record

Independent redistricting commissions — bodies insulated from the legislative majority that draw congressional and state legislative district maps — have been proposed in the United States for roughly a hundred years. Until the 2010s, almost no states had adopted them in a meaningful form. Most states drew maps through the legislative majority, with predictable partisan results.

The 2010s changed that. California adopted its commission via ballot measure in 2008-2010. Arizona’s commission, adopted earlier, survived a 2015 Supreme Court challenge. Michigan adopted its commission in 2018, Colorado in 2018, and several other states have followed in various forms.

We now have enough empirical record to evaluate the results. This brief summarizes what the research shows and what the next fights are.

What independent commissions do differently

The core feature of an independent commission is insulation from the legislative majority’s direct control. The specific designs vary:

• California: 14 commissioners (5 Democrats, 5 Republicans, 4 unaffiliated), selected through a multi-stage application and vetting process designed to prevent partisan stacking. Maps require approval from supermajorities including unaffiliated members.
• Michigan: 13 commissioners (4 Democrats, 4 Republicans, 5 independents), selected through a randomized application process, with similar supermajority rules.
• Arizona: 5 commissioners (2 Democrats, 2 Republicans, 1 independent chair, with the partisan members selected from lists of nominees prepared by legislative leaders).
• Colorado: 12 commissioners (4 Democrats, 4 Republicans, 4 unaffiliated), selected through a randomized process from applicant pools.

The substantive criteria the commissions apply also vary, but most include: equal population, contiguity, compactness, communities of interest preservation, Voting Rights Act compliance, and explicit prohibitions on drawing maps to favor or disfavor a party or incumbent.

The procedural rules typically include public hearings, public comment periods, multiple rounds of mapping with public input, and requirements that the commission publish its reasoning in detail.

What the empirical record shows

Several rounds of academic research have now examined the effects of independent commissions:

More competitive districts. Independent-commission states show meaningfully more competitive general elections than partisan-drawn states with similar political geography. The effect is largest in California and Michigan; smaller but visible in Arizona and Colorado.

Better community preservation. Communities of interest (cities, neighborhoods, ethnic and cultural communities) are kept whole at higher rates under commission-drawn maps. This is partly because the criteria require it; partly because the commission process creates accountability for splits.

Higher public confidence. Surveys of voters in commission states show higher confidence in the fairness of the redistricting process than in partisan-drawn states. This effect is bipartisan — both Democratic and Republican voters in commission states report higher confidence than their counterparts in non-commission states.

Reduced partisan asymmetry. The “efficiency gap” (a quantitative measure of partisan gerrymandering) is smaller in commission states than in partisan-drawn states. The reduction is not zero — political geography produces some asymmetry even with neutral mapping — but it is substantially closer to neutral.

No clear partisan winner. Importantly, commissions have not consistently advantaged either party. California’s commission produced maps that initially worried both parties; the actual electoral outcomes have been close to what neutral mapping would predict. Michigan’s first commission map produced political geography roughly matching the state’s actual partisan split. The bipartisan critics in each state have generally come from incumbents whose previously safe seats became competitive.

What didn’t go as planned

The first decade of commission experience has surfaced several challenges:

Commissioner selection is hard. Identifying genuinely unaffiliated commissioners who are willing to serve, and screening out partisans posing as independents, is more difficult than the founding documents anticipated. Michigan and California have refined their processes after early experience.

Public input is uneven. Public hearings tend to be dominated by organized partisan groups when the partisan stakes are high. Commissions have had to balance broad public input with input from genuinely affected community groups.

VRA compliance creates real tensions. The Voting Rights Act requires drawing some districts to preserve minority voting power; balancing this against compactness and partisan-neutrality criteria requires judgment calls that commissions make publicly and that can be litigated.

Speed is an issue. Commission processes are slower than legislative ones, particularly when census data is delayed (as in 2020-2021).

The state of play in 2025

States with independent or substantially independent commissions: California, Michigan, Arizona, Colorado, New Jersey (some districts), Washington, New York (advisory), Iowa (legislative service agency model, somewhat different but generally treated as independent).

States with active campaigns to adopt commissions: Ohio (multiple ballot attempts; partial passage in 2018, more comprehensive proposal advancing); Wisconsin (constitutional amendment process underway); Pennsylvania (legislative path stalled); Florida (multiple attempts).

States resistant to commission adoption: Texas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia, and others where partisan-drawn maps have produced lopsided delegations and the majority party has strong incentives to retain control.

The federal question

The Freedom to Vote Act, the standing Senate vehicle for federal voting rights legislation, includes federal standards for redistricting — including a ban on partisan gerrymandering with judicial enforcement. After the 2019 Supreme Court ruling in Rucho v. Common Cause held that partisan-gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable in federal court under the Constitution, the federal lever shifted from litigation to legislation. The Freedom to Vote Act would create a federal statutory cause of action that the federal courts would have to address.

The Senate procedural posture has been the binding constraint. The bill has had floor votes but has not cleared cloture. Whether it passes depends on the Senate political balance and on procedural rule changes that have been debated but not adopted.

What to watch

• 2030 redistricting cycle preparation. The next census is in 2030; states without commissions have a roughly five-year window to adopt them before maps are drawn.
• Ohio and Wisconsin ballot/amendment fights. Active in 2025-2026.
• Federal Freedom to Vote Act. Reintroduced; outcome depends on Senate procedural posture.
• Litigation under existing state commission designs. Courts continue to refine the doctrine on what counts as adequate independence and adequate criteria.
• Multi-state coordination on best practices. Several states are studying each other’s designs as they refine their own processes.

Bottom line

Independent redistricting commissions have a real, measurable track record. The empirical case for them is strong, the political case for them is bipartisan in principle, and the design lessons are now well understood. Spreading them to the remaining states is the most tractable structural fix to one of the worst pathologies of the US political system. The question is no longer whether they work; it is how fast they can be adopted.